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Abstract
High levels of imprisonment and its associated costs have pressured criminologist and
policymakers to create and establish new policies intended to reduce incarceration
spending and lower the number of individuals under correctional facilities. Justice
Reinvestment Initiatives (JRI) have been developed with the basic idea of redirecting the
$54 billion annual incarceration spending toward rebuilding human resources and
physical infrastructure of high-risk communities. These initiatives should create local
programs that promote successful reentry, reduce recidivism, decrease prison usage, and
improve public safety. Oregon passed the Justice Reinvestment Act in 2013, which
allowed for all 36 Oregon counties to implement JRI programs to best fit their local
needs. The present study explores three questions: 1) do the stated goals of each county
fall in line with the seven goals of Oregon’s Justice Reinvestment Act, 2) what are the
types of programs being developed in each county, and 3) does the Justice Reinvestment
Act in Oregon align with the general JRI literature. This analysis is completed using a
systematic content analysis (SCA). By categorizing the text of the grant applications
through a structured, systematic coding scheme this analysis found the stated goals in
Oregon counties are, for the most part, in line with the Justice Reinvestment Act. A total
of 95 programs were planned in the 2017-2019 grant applications falling into six
categories. Further analysis concludes the Justice Reinvestment Act does not embrace the
full literature of justice reinvestment and policy recommendations are made to ensure
Oregon is working toward all intended goals.
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Introduction
Crimes rates have been decreasing over the past 20 years according to the
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data (FBI, n.d.), yet incarceration rates have remained
relatively high. There are currently 2.1 million American adults incarcerated in federal,
state, and local prisons and jails (Kaeble & Cowhig, 2018), costing $54 billion a year
(Rivers, 2011). Criminologists and policymakers have called on the use of initiatives like
Justice Reinvestment Initiatives (JRI) to decrease incarceration rates and costs, and help
offenders successfully integrate back into society, all while improving public safety
(Tucker & Cadora, 2003).
Justice Reinvestment is an evidence-based approach that identifies the drivers of
imprisonment and attempts to shift resources to those areas (Rivers, 2011). It aims to
reinvest the money saved from using these programs, instead of incarceration, back into
the communities most impacted by high incarceration rates. The services provided are
supposed to ensure crime is prevented effectively, while increasing public safety (Tucker
& Cadora, 2003). According to Rivers (2011), JRI reaches these goals through four steps:
1) identifying the causes of jails and prison population growth; 2) creating policies which
generate savings and increase public safety; 3) quantifying said savings and reinvesting in
high-risk communities; and 4) measuring the impact of these initiatives. So far, 35
counites have reformed their criminal justice polices through JRI (PEW, 2018). In certain
states, like Oregon, JRI programs vary within the state.
Oregon passed House Bill 3194, also known as the Justice Reinvestment Act, in
July of 2013. The goal of this legislation is to invest in public safety infrastructure,
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implement evidence-based community correction programs that are cost-effective and
successful in reducing recidivism. It seeks to invest in local law enforcement, community
corrections, victim services, and specialty courts. It aims to provide local communities
with the resources needed to focus prison resources on violent offenders and hold
offenders accountable while boosting public safety. This legislation stresses the need to
maintain an effective public safety system by reinvesting cost associated with averted
prison growth towards local communities (H.B. 3194, 2013).
This research is not concerned with whether Oregon JRI efforts and programs are
effectively reducing recidivism, prison rates, or prison costs. Rather, this research poses
two main questions: 1) are counties adhering to the seven goals of House Bill 3194 and 2)
what type of programs are being implemented across the 36 counties. The study also
includes a sub-analysis of whether the overall JRI efforts in Oregon are in line with core
JRI framework themes advanced by the justice reinvestment literature. A systematic
content analysis (SCA) approach is taken to answer these questions. The relevance of JRI
is first established, along with a detailed description of the national justice reinvestment
literature and House Bill 3194.
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Literature Review
Mass Incarceration
The rise of mass incarceration in the United States began in the 1970s when the
punitive sanction mindset toward criminal activity took popularity. The United States
began adapting a punishment-based philosophy, leaving behind the rehabilitative agenda
in the 1960s (Clear & Frost, 2014). The shift towards punitive-based philosophy can be
tied to the political discourse of the 1968 presidential election. Both republican
candidates, Richard Nixon and George Wallace, ran on a ‘law and order’ platform,
calling for a war on crime. They believed the crime problem in the United states was
rooted in rational choice and individual responsibility, a shift from placing the blame on
societal issues. This attitude towards crime resulted in a general endorsement of using
imprisonment as the primary method to fight crime (Clear & Frost, 2014). As a result,
there was a switch from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing in the mid1970s. Though determinate sentencing was used to reform a variety of sentencing laws, it
is generally referred to as sentence set by a judge without the discretion of a parole board
(Marvell and Moody, 1996). Determinate sentencing reform led to an increase in length
of stay and prison admissions resulting in a 45% imprisonment increase in 1980 from
1970 (BJS, 1982; BJS, 1984).
Political discourse continued shaping mass incarceration in the 1980s. President
Nixon called for a war on drugs during his time in office, declaring illegal drugs “public
enemy number one” (Alexander, 2012). However, it was President Reagan’s
administration that officially announced the fight on illegal drugs following the crack
3

epidemic. This led to the creation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, which brought severe penalties for drug related offenses (Clear
& Frost, 2014). Through these sentencing reforms, anyone convicted of selling at least
five grams of crack cocaine were required to serve a minimum of five years in prison. If
caught selling more than 50 grams, a ten-year minimum sentence was required. As a
result, the number of people sentenced to a drug-related offence increased from 12,000 in
1980 to 102,000 in 1991 (Clear & Frost, 2014).
In the 1990s, President Clinton continued this tough-on-crime attitude declaring
he would be tougher on crime than any Republican (Alexander, 2012).He shifted the
focus towards violent and repeat offenders and addressed them as ‘super-predators’
referring to ‘young and ruthless’ delinquents (Clear & Frost, 2014). It was thought that
these teens were the worst set of juvenile offenders of any generation. Violent offences
increased 33% from the mid-80’s to the 1990’s (Clear & Frost, 2014) and harsher
punishment was seen as the only answer to stop the rise of violence. This political
rhetoric gave the public the perception that repeat offenders accounted for a
disproportionate share of criminal activity and public sentiment towards harsher
sentencing for these offenders grew. During the Clinton administration, mandatory
minimums and three-strikes legislation were created. Mandatory sentences required a
minimum time to be served of a conviction for certain offenses, meaning judges were not
permitted to sentence less than the statutorily mandated minimum (Roberts, 2003). Truthin sentencing was also created during this era. This policy mandated violent offenders to
serve 85% of their sentence by decreasing the discretion of parole boards and
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implementing determinant sentencing practices (Ditto & Wilson, 1999). Some states also
restricted eligibility for parole to ensure full sentence completion. Three-strikes laws
were created for violent habitual offenders and varied from state to state, both in terms of
sentencing length and number of strikes. Some states would double or triple a sentence,
while others would require a life sentence after the final strike. Some states even included
drug offense in their three-strikes laws (Clear & Frost, 2014).
Criminological theories also played a role in these policy creations. Deterrence
theory and rational choice theory made their appearance in criminal justice literature
during the 70s and 80s (Cullen et al., 2018). Both theories argue that people are rational
beings who pursue their own self-interests, capable of weighing the costs and benefits of
their actions (Cullen et al., 2018). People will choose to engage in criminal activity if it is
advantageous to them. Deterrence theory suggests the only way to prevent crime is
through swift, certain, and severe punishment (Bernard et al., 2016). This discourse
added to the tough-on-crime movement.
The rise of mass incarceration cannot be fully understood without acknowledging
the effects race and poverty had in its development. The ‘law and order’ platform first
emerged in the late 1950s when southern officials publicly opposed the Civil Rights
Movement (Alexander, 2012). Civil rights protests were deemed criminal rather than
political. The riots that took place after the Martin Luther King Jr. assassination further
pushed the narrative of the lawlessness of civil rights. Barry Goldwater’s presidential
campaign condemned these riots and pushed the fear of ‘black crime’ which set the
foundation for the tough-on-crime movement (Alexander, 2012). Forman (2017) notes
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that Black politicians were also pushing the ‘law and order’ and tough-on-crime policies,
with the goal of protecting Black youth from self-destruction. The war on drugs centered
on inner-city neighborhoods, who’s increasing unemployment rates left people with
limited options. The sale and use of crack cocaine were booming in these neighborhoods
and consequently, the target of the war on drugs (Forman, 2017). By 1991, one in four
young Black men were in the hands of the criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012).
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates 350,000 people were incarcerated in
1970 and by 1980 that number had rose to roughly 520,000 individuals (BJS, 1982; BJS,
1984). At the end of 1990 there were slightly over 1 million incarcerated Americans,
reaching almost 2 million by the end of the 20th century (Snell, 1995; West & Sabol,
2009). Incarceration rates peaked in 2008 with 2.3 million people and have been slightly
declining since with a current number of 2.1 million individuals under correctional
facilities (Carson, 2018; Zeny, 2018). Given the drastic rise of incarceration since the
1970s, there have been urgent calls for prison reform policies, including justice
reinvestment.
Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI)
The realities of American crime and punishment are the driving force for JRI.
Tucker and Cadora (2003) argue that the 2.1 million incarcerated Americans is a result of
the war on drugs, three-strikes law, mandatory sentencing, and the desertion of the
rehabilitative philosophy. Tucker and Cadora (2003), writing in an Open Society Institute
paper, present one of the earliest visions of JRI and an arguably broader vision of JRI.
They argue imprisonment alone is not enough to guarantee public safety but rather states
6

should be investing in services that target education, health, and vocational programs in
low-income communities. The focus on low-income communities is vital because if
inmates are returning to communities that lack resources, then the chance of successful
reentry is compromised.
JRI programs should be used to build an environment that will result in successful
transition from prison to community by creating good jobs, accessible healthcare, and
affordable education. JRI aims to provide community-level solutions for communitylevel problems. This goes back to the rehabilitative philosophy, focusing on structural
issues rather than individual blame. JRI is about placing accountability and responsibility
on a local level, where successful reentry is a shared responsibility between the
government, the community, and the individual. Local communities need to ask
themselves how they can strengthen their neighborhoods to keep their residents out of
prison (Tucker & Cadora, 2003).
Clear (2011) states there are three overarching public opinions which make
downsizing incarceration rates feasible. First, as crime rates reduce so does public alarm
about crime, creating an opening for new policy ideas. Second, high imprisonment rates
demonstrate the necessity to replace policies that sustain mass incarceration with those
that will decrease prison rates. Lastly, 68% of prisoners recidivate within the first three
years of being released (Alper et al., 2018), which demonstrates the inability of
correctional institutes to properly treat, train, or rehabilitate inmates for life outside of
prison. Clear (2011) also argues JRI has broad bipartisan support as it reduces mass
incarceration, which appeals to the left, and reduces government costs, which appeals to
7

the right. While these public opinions make JRI possible, the main driving force is the
fiscal crises many states are facing (Clear, 2011). JRI would redirect the $54 billion spent
on mass incarceration to rebuild the human resources and physical infrastructure of
neighborhoods most impacted by mass incarceration, while also increasing public safety
(Tucker & Cadora, 2003). This is a shift from unproductive spending toward investing in
long-term positive changes.
Several states have used the JRI approach to decrease the amount of state funds
spent on prisons and to minimize incarceration rates of the state. The Council of State
Governments (CSG) Justice Center supported some of the earliest projects in 2004
(Clear, 2011). They began their support in Connecticut, where they estimated saving $30
million in imprisonment costs. They used $13 million of the savings to reinvest in
community-based projects. In 2002, Connecticut had the highest prison growth rate and
by 2013 they had the most rapidly decreasing incarceration rate. The CSG Justice Center
has worked with 25 states in the past and is currently working with six on JRI projects,
including Oregon (CSG, n.d.).
Participating states have created their own version of JRI initiatives with different
steps and goals in mind. Taxman et al. (2014) stress the importance that JRI efforts
include and increase the number of accessible intervention and treatment programs. They
call for effective programing within correctional and community settings. They argue that
increased access to these programs can reduce recidivism rates as well as incarceration
rates. Welsh-Loveman and Harvell (2018), with the Urban Institute, report the areas in
which states with JRI have reinvested their money. Most of these funds have gone
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towards community supervision, treatment, and other community services. The remaining
funds have gone towards in-prison programs, law enforcement, victim services, and
pretrial reform (Welsh-Loveman & Harvell, 2018). The Urban Institute has worked with
35 states on JRI projects. As of 2017, they had reinvested $557 million since 2010.
LaVigne et al. (2014) explain there are two types of reinvestments: upfront investment
before savings are realized and reinvesting from actual savings. States must first use
upfront investments through legislative appropriations to see actual savings. Reinvesting
actual savings requires calculation and documentation of actual savings and averted
spending.
House Bill 3194
House Bill 3194, also known as the Justice Reinvestment Act, was introduced into
the Oregon legislature in July of 2013. This bill came from the work of the Commission
of Public Safety and its collaboration with the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI). The
commission was a bipartisan collaboration lead by the Department of Corrections,
Oregon Supreme Court, and the state legislature. In 2012, the Oregon Governor tasked
the commission with developing evidence-based policies that would decrease the rate and
cost of corrections while improving public safety (LaVigne et al., 2014). After
identifying the drivers that lead to Oregon’s 50% prison increase from 2000 to 2010,
several policies were created, including removing mandatory minimums for repeat drug
offenders and reducing sentences for marijuana offenses, driving while suspended, and
other non-violent offenses; strengthening reentry programming by expanding transitional
leave, implementing earned discharge, and requiring the use of risk-needs evaluations;
9

and by requiring reports on progress and financial spending for community supervision,
rehabilitation research, and evidence-based programing to the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission (CJC) (House Bill 3194, 2013; LaVigne et al., 2014).
The goals of this legislation were to invest in public safety infrastructure by
implementing evidence-based community correction programs that are cost-effective and
successful in reducing recidivism. Invest in local law enforcement, community
corrections, victim services, and specialty courts. Provide local communities with the
resources needed to focus prison resources on violent offenders and hold offenders
accountable while protecting public safety. This legislation aims to maintain an effective
public safety system by reinvesting cost associated with averted prison growth towards
local communities (H.B. 3194, 2013). Through the governor’s budget and legislative
appropriations, Oregon initially invested $58 million of projected prison cost savings to
support local programs (LaVigne et al., 2014). As of 2016, Oregon has reinvested $98
million in upfront savings and subsequent reinvestment from savings and averted costs
(Urban Institute, 2017). The bill also created the Justice Reinvestment Grant Program to
distribute the savings from averted prison growth among the 36 Oregon counties. The
CJC webpage states the target of this program is to “financially support Oregon counties
to plan, implement, or expand initiatives that reduce recidivism, reduce prison
population, increase public safety, and hold offenders accountable,” (CJC, n.d.a). The
grant program requires counties to use three percent of their funds for research and ten
percent for victim services, resulting in counties using 87% of their funds to develop

10

local programs. Every two years counties apply for the grant by describing how they plan
to use their JRI funds (CJC, n.d.a).
Seven specific goals can be obtained from the House Bill 3194 text: 1) focus
prison resources on violent offenders, 2) invest in evidence-based community corrections,
3) invest in local law enforcement, 4) invest in specialty courts, 5) invest in victim
services, 6) hold offenders accountable, and 7) increase public safety. House Bill 3194
allows each county to implement JRI programs that best support the local needs of the
community, so long as they fall in line with the goals of the act.
The main focus of this research is whether the stated goals of each county are
adhering to the seven objectives of the Justice Reinvestment Act. Second, this study will
examine the type of programs developed across each county. The last thing this research
will examine is if the Justice Reinvestment Act falls in line with the overall JRI literature.
The 2017-2019 grant applications are used to assess the first and second research
questions. These applications only demonstrate the intention of implementing programs
and the intent of complying with the seven goals of House Bill 3194. The applications
alone cannot guarantee counties are actually implementing programs or meeting the
seven goals. Measuring actual implementation would have been ideal for this study, but
the available data did not allow for such analysis. Nonetheless, there is still a benefit in
studying intent. Studying intent visualizes the problems of each county and the approach
they plan to take. A similar issue can be resolved through different approaches, thus the
stated intent to address an issue gives a better understanding of the resources, and skillset,
and political preferences of each county.
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The second research question examines differences in the type of programs each
county planned to implement. This analysis will help establish any major themes across
counties, especially considering the difference between urban and rural counties. The
amount of funds each county receives will likely have an impact on the type of programs
they are able to develop. This analysis will allow inferences to be made about the
programs in Oregon.
The sub-analysis of this study asks if the goals of House Bill 3194 fall in line with
the JRI literature. As seen in Table 1, both generally share the same overall goals and
differ in only a few ways. This study will examine if the goals that are not stated in
Oregon are vital to the JRI literature. This study will see how Oregon intends to reach
Table 1
Justice Reinvestment goals compared to House Bill 3194 goals
Goals of General JRI
House Bill 3194 goals
Decrease prison use
Decrease prison use
Reduce recidivism

Reduce recidivism

Reduce prison costs

Reduce prison costs

Increase public safety

Hold offenders accountable and increase public
safety

Assess the measures

Assess the measures

Reinvest actual savings

Reinvest actual savings

Reinvest into the physical infrastructure
of high-risk communities

Reinvest into local public safety infrastructure

Invest in proactive measures

Invest in law enforcement, community
corrections, and specialty courts
Focus prison resources on violent offenders
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their goals and how the intended efforts of the counties aid in their plans for JRI
implementation. The implications of these differences will be discussed.
These three questions will help establish if there is fidelity within JRI in Oregon.
This research aims to demonstrate if the practices fall in line with the bill and if the bill
falls in line with the overall JRI literature. Consequently, three questions are posed: 1) are
counties adhering to the eight goals of House Bill 3194, 2) what are the type of programs
being implemented across the 36 counties, and 3) whether the overall JRI efforts in
Oregon are in line with the justice reinvestment literature.
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Methods
Data Sample
Data for this analysis was collected from the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission, specifically from the Justice Reinvestment Grant Program. The program
manager supplied the 2017-2019 grant applications for all 36 counties. The applications
include a short narrative of each program and their expected cost. There is specific
language asking who they are targeting, research on evidence-based practices, and how
they plan to measure the effectiveness of each program. The applications ask counties to
provide an explanation on how they plan to reduce recidivism, lower prison use for
driving, drug, and property offenses, hold offenders accountable, and increase public
safety. Information on how much of the grant fund each count received for the 2017-2019
biennial is also provided. While application exist for the 2013-2015 and the 2015-2017
grant cycle, this analysis only examined the most recent grant applications.
To get a better understanding of the 36 Oregon Counties, Table 2 list counties’
population size, the classification of the county (i.e. urban vs rural), the amount of grant
funds they received for the 2017-2019 biennial, and the number of programs they planned
to implement. The placement of urban or rural comes from the United States Census
Bureau. They classify counties with less than 50,000 people as rural and those with
50,000 or more are considered urban counties (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). All tables in
this study will be organized from the highest populated county to the least populated.
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Table 2
Population, classification, award amount, and program total of each county
Population1
Multnomah
811,880
Washington
597, 695
Clackamas
416,075
Lane
379,611
Marion
346,868
Jackson
219,564
Deschutes
191,996
Linn
127,335
Douglas
110,285
Yamhill
107,002
Benton
92,101
Josephine
87,393
Polk
85,234
Umatilla
77,516
Klamath
67,653
Coos
64,389
Columbia
52,377
Lincoln
49,388
Clatsop
39,674
Malheur
30,725
Tillamook
26,787
Wasco
26,505
Union
26,461
Jefferson
24,194
Crook
23,867
Hood River
23,428
Curry
22,813
Baker
16,006
Morrow
11,372
Lake
7,879
Harney
7,329
Grant
7,176
Wallowa
7,081
Gilliam
1,890
Sherman
1,708
Wheeler
1,366
1
U. S. Census Bureau (n.d.)
2
U. S. Census Bureau. (2019)
3
CJC (n.d.b)

Classification2
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural

Award ($)3
7,888,646
3,746,921
2,411,582
3,707,060
3,754,893
2,240,180
1,741,920
1,654,226
1,642,267
944,702
514,205
1,191,840
597,913
916,800
1,227,714
789,245
554,066
581,969
486,302
290,984
298,956
458,400
310,915
346,789
298,956
155,457
215,249
223,221
139,513
171,402
127,555
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000

JRI programs
1
2
3
3
8
4
1
2
4
2
3
5
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
3
3
4
4
4
1
2
1
1
2
3
5
1
4
1
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Analytical Technique
A systematic content analysis (SCA) of the 2017-2019 grant applications was
used to analyze this data. Drisko and Maschi (2015) define content analysis as a research
technique that allows researchers to make valid inferences from large texts. This strategy
categorizes parts of text through a structured, systematic coding scheme. Inferences can
then be made about the message itself, the authors or receivers of the message, and even
the impact of the message. This analysis allows for replication by providing clear
specifications of the coding and procedures. According to Salehijam (2018), SCA is a
frequently utilized tactic by social scientists and researchers “to analyze interview
transcripts, literature, and field notes amongst other sources” (p. 35). SCA can produce
both qualitative and quantitative results by enabling the researcher to condense large
amount of text into fewer content categories (Salehijam, 2018). The 2017-2019 JRI grant
applications were on average 96 pages in length. The use of a software tool, ATLAS.ti,
made this analysis more productive. ATLAS.ti provides the ability to create consistent,
valid, and adequate codes as described by Quesada (2010). Quesada found the use of this
software tool to increase productivity in data analysis.
Before running the 36 applications through ATLAS.ti, the applications were first
manually analyzed to understand what kind of codes could be created with the provided
documents. Since all the programs have very specific names, categorizing the programs
had to be done by hand. For example, Malheur county named their diversion program
MC 3194 Supervision. This specific name could not be grouped with other diversion
programs using ATLAS.ti. Categorizing the type of community corrections programs
16

were done manually for the same reason listed above. Quantifying the number of
programs each county had applied for also required manual labor. This approach was
used to answer the second research question, which examines the differences in the types
of JRI programs across Oregon.
All 36 applications were uploaded to ATLAS.ti with the name of the county and
the number depending on the population rank. Multnomah county was labled number one
since it has the highest population count and Wheeler County was numbered 36 as it has
the least number of people. Seven codes were developed using ATLAS.ti: Law
Enforcement, Public Safety, Not Evidence-Based, Offender Accountability, Specialty
Courts, Victim Services, and Violent Offenders. Developing the code for Law
Enforcement required going to the budget section of every application and focusing on
the personnel, training, and equipment sections. The personnel section listed the type of
personnel (i.e. officers, managers, legal assistants, etc.), whether they were full-time or
part-time hires, and the salary amount. Counites that listed parole officers, probation
officers, retrial officers, or deputy sheriffs were added into the Law Enforcement code, as
well as counties that listed training and equipment in their budget. The Not EvidenceBased code was made by going to the program description of each program and reading
the section that asked how the program was evidence-based. Programs that did not
account for how they were based in evidence or did not give an adequate explanation
were added to this code.
Public Safety, Offender Accountability, Specialty Courts, Victim Services, and
Violent Offenders codes were analyzed using the same strategy. An auto-code was run
17

looking for the exact word(s) in the applications. The software highlighted the sentence in
which the word(s) appeared. Sentences that were relevant to the topic were added to that
specific code and those that were not useful were left out. Once all the codes were
created, a report was produced for each code and later used to write up the results of the
main research question and answer if the intended goals of each county were in line with
the seven goals of House Bill 3194.
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Results
The first research question asks if the 36 Oregon counties are aiming for the seven
goals of House Bill 3194. The results of this SCA are discussed in the order of the goals,
which are 1) focus prison resources on violent offenders, 2) invest in evidence-based
community corrections, 3) invest in local law enforcement, 4) invest in specialty courts,
5) invest in victim services, 6) hold offenders accountable, and 7) increase public safety.
1) Focus prison resources on violent offenders
The analysis revealed only seven of the 36 counites (19%) included specific
language about excluding violent offenders from their JRI programs. Multnomah county
aimed to exclude sex crimes, domestic violence, offenses against children, and the
majority of violent offenses from their Multnomah County Justice Reinvestment Program
(MCJRP) eligibility. High-risk property offenders in Lane county were said to be placed
under community supervision while violent offenders would be sent to prison. Benton
county’s drug treatment program claims to not process offenders with possession of a
substantial quantity of drugs, delivery or manufacturing of drugs, other commercial drug
offenses, or certain violent offenses. The aim of Clatsop county’s pretrial release program
is to free up jail beds and reserve them for violent offenders. They state that female
offenders would be most eligible for this program as they are less likely to be convicted
of violent offenses.
The drug treatment court and prison diversion program in Marion County are
tailored towards non-violent offenders. Specifically, their target population for the drug
treatment court are non-violent misdemeanor and felony drug offenders who possess
19

medium or high criminogenic risk factors. Yamhill County gives the following account
for how their SMART evidence-based sentencing program focuses prison resources on
violent offenders,
Yamhill County's SMART Evidence-Based Sentencing Program has reduced the
local state prison population by identifying prison-bound non-violent offenders
who can be deferred from prison and safely managed in the community under
supervision. (Yamhill County application).

The JRI program in Malheur county is reserved for offenders who are short-term
transitional leave inmates, on downward departure probation, have substance related
offenses, have property offenses, or are non-violent mentally ill offenders with substance
or property related offenses.
These findings cannot definitively conclude that the remainder of the counties are
allowing some proportion of violent offenders to be part of their JRI initiatives. Hence, it
is unclear the types of offenders being impacted by almost all the JRI programs in the
state and whether the goal is being met or not. These results demonstrate there is a lack of
language regarding inclusion or exclusion of violent offenses in the grant applications.
This could be remedied by asking counties to specifically clarify the offense types
eligible, targeted, or impacted by their initiatives. It is also important to note that the bill
itself takes action on this front. The Justice Reinvestment Act modified sentences for
felony marijuana offenses, property offenses, and for driving on a suspended license. It
modified presumptive sentences for certain identity theft or robbery offenses and
eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offenses. This bill aimed to
direct prison resources towards violent offenders by placing property, drug, and driving
20

offenders under community supervision and away from prison. This allows for JRI funds
to be used towards supervising non-violent offenders in the community.
2) Invest in evidence-based community corrections
There are approximately 29,000 individuals under community supervision in the
state of Oregon (DOC, 2018). Oregon has upwards of 15,000 offenders under prison or
jail facilities with 10,000 convicted of violent crimes (DOC, 2018). The aim to reserve
prison resources for violent offenders gives the possibility of 5,000 more inmates being
placed under community corrections in Oregon, requiring counties to invest in
community correction services. The Justice Reinvestment Act explicitly states the need
for these community correction programs to be evidence-based, cost-effective, and
successful in reducing recidivism. Twenty-six out of the 36 counties (72%) planned to
implement community correction services including reentry programs, transitional
housing, diversion programs, day reporting centers, work crew programs, and other
general community correction services.
Reentry programs are designed to help inmates successfully integrate back into
the community. These programs provide an array of services including mentoring,
mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, housing, vocational training,
educational opportunities, parenting classes, cognitive treatment, transportation, among
other basic resources depending on the needs of each individual (Gill & Wilson, 2017).
Transitional housing programs are community based residential facilities and are similar
to reentry programs. The goals of both these programs are to reduce recidivism and to aid
in successful reintegration through treatment, support, and assistance (Garland et al.,
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2017). House Bill 3194 modified the Oregon law to increase the maximum period of
short-term transitional leave and required the Department of Corrections to assist inmates
in applying for transitional leave programs.
Diversion programs are a type of sentencing where adults are referred to
community-based treatment programs to reduce prison or jail overcrowding. They
attempt to fix the underlying behavior problem that led to the criminal act through
supervision and treatment (Wong et al., 2019). Day reporting centers share similar
characteristics as diversion programs as alternative sanctions to prison. Both programs
require regular check-ins and provide treatment services as appropriate (Craddock, 2004).
Work crew programs are alternative sanctions where offenders are required to work for a
certain number of hours on community service projects. Many argue this is a form of
restorative justice in which offenders make up for their anti-social behavior through
community involvement (Wood, 2012). Given the difference in structure of reentry
programs and transitional housing, the assumption can be made that diversion programs,
day reporting centers, and work crew programs cost less. However, being a cheaper
option is not to say these services are cost-effective.
Table 3 displays the kind and quantity of community correction programs said to
be operative in the JRI initiatives across Oregon. Thirteen counties invested in
transitional housing and twelve funded reentry programs. Work crew programs were
planned in five counties, three counties aimed to use diversion programs, and day
reporting centers were reported in only two counites. General community correction
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Table 3
Community corrections programs in each county by category
Reentry
Multnomah
Washington
Clackamas
Lane
Marion
Jackson
Deschutes
Linn
Douglas
Yamhill
Benton
Josephine
Polk
Umatilla
Klamath
Coos
Columbia
Lincoln
Clatsop
Malheur
Tillamook
Wasco
Union
Jefferson
Crook
Hood River
Curry
Baker
Morrow
Lake
Harney
Grant
Wallowa
Gilliam
Sherman
Wheeler

Transitional

Day report

Work crew

General

Diversion

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

✔

✔
✔
✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

✔

✔

✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
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programs were developed in five counties and have similar aspects of the other
community correction programs including treatment, support, and supervision. Of the
counties that hoped to implement community correction programs, half included more
than one program as seen in Table 3.
Invest in evidence-based community corrections
The 26 counties that sought to invest in community correction programs, made
sure they were investing in evidence-based community corrections. The JRI grant
application for Oregon required every county to explain how each of their programs were
based in evidence. All proposed community correction programs were alleged to be
based in evidence. Some counties provided more detailed explanations of their evidencebased practiced than others. For example, Baker county justified their work crew program
by stating “numerous studies that have shown community service is one of the most
impactful sanctions in reducing recidivism,” but provided no further explanation. On the
other hand, Lane county gave the following account for their reentry program,
All partners in this program apply the principles of Risk, Needs, and
Responsivity. They also follow the “Fundamental Principles of Evidence-Based
Correctional Practice” as described below…staff administer the LS/CMI prior to
release from prison and immediately after clients are admitted to the
program…programs utilize Motivational Interviewing (MI). MI is included on
SAMHSA’s National Registry of Evidence Based Programs and Practices
(NREPP)…tailored case plan[s] for each client which addresses the top
criminogenic risks/need factors [are developed]…Sponsors and Emergence both
use Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) which targets criminogenic predictors of
crime and recidivism…POs also utilize the SAFE curriculum as cognitive
behavioral interventions, skill building, and homework to contribute to the
required dosage proven to reduce risk and overall recidivism. (Lane county
application).
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Benton county explained the evidence-based component of their community correction
program as follows,
Benton County utilizes core principles of EBP to implement and sustain researchbased supervision and case management practices which best addresses offender
needs. We continue to build the evidence-based skill-set of our staff and focus on
EBP strategies, including the use of validated risk assessments, Case Plans, Carey
Guides, Change Contracts (action plans)….Benton County Community
Corrections addresses all criminogenic risk factors through a validated risk
assessment tool, and having access to vital services, sanctions, and programs
designed to address risk factors enhances our ability to contribute to offender
success…The programming is highly interactive and engages participants in
curriculum that assists them in examining their thoughts, behavior and core
values. These programs are available to all supervised offenders. Evidence-based
cognitive behavioral programs include Thinking for a Change and Anne Fields
Motivational Enhancement Therapy (MET).

Of the programs that were not community corrections related, four did not
describe their evidence-based practices. One of the programs came from Harney county,
which planned to implement security cameras in their transitional housing unit. They did
not address how their implementation of cameras were evidence based. This is not a
program but merely an equipment needed for their transitional housing services. Wallowa
county wanted to develop an alcohol, drug, and mental health program. From their
description of the program, the aim was to work with a local clinic to administer drug
tests on their clients. They did not address how this program is evidence-based.
Two of the four programs described by Sherman County were not evidencebased. The Sherman County Community Outreach aims to provide an array of training to
offenders on parole or probation. They do not address how these programs are based in
evidence, but rather give a description of what they believe will be helpful. The other
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program aimed to hire a work crew supervisor, which would supervise their clients doing
community services. Much like Harney county, this is not necessarily a program, but a
position for a program. They also fail to state the connection to evidence-based practices
or success of this position, but rather point to the use of this position in other states.
While these programs could be argued to be evidence-based, these three counties do not
present a clear argument.
3) Invest in local law enforcement
If counties are expanding their community correction services, then each agency
will require additional resources to adequately serve their clients. Twenty-six of the 36
counties intended to invest in local law enforcement in the form of hiring addition fulltime and part-time parole and probation officers, pretrial officers, and deputies, as well as
investing in officer training and equipment. Over half of the 26 counties supported more
than one type of investment. Of the 15 counties that wanted to hire one or more full time
probation or parole officers, ten were from urban counties. Urban counties received more
JRI funds likely because of the higher number of offenders compared to rural counties.
Most rural counties likely did not have the justification or the funds to hire a full-time
officer.
Hiring more officers was generally done with the intention to aid in their
community corrections programs. Tillamook county explained their parole and probation
officer program as follows,
The grant funded Parole and Probation Officer Program is a full-time Parole and
Probation Officer position. The officer will carry a general case load with felonies
26

and misdemeanors that has a focus on drug and driving related crime. The officer
will perform duties as defined in ORS 181.610(13), 137.620 and 137.630…areas
of training are required for this grant funded parole and probation officer position.
Therefore, the officer is required to attend the academy and obtain Parole and
Probation Basic Certification…It is important that the officers are current and up
to date with evidence based practices, risk assessment tools, specialty training for
specific caseloads (sex offenders and domestic violence) and are able to gain
their required hours of training in specific areas; firearms and use of force, ethics,
CPR and first aid, and leadership (when applicable). (Tillamook county
application).

Morrow county gave the following explanation for why they needed an additional parole
and probation officer,
The Officer Position that the Justice Reinvestment Grant is funding has reduced
the current amount of offenders on each caseload. Our caseloads were
[approximately] 55 before we hired the new position. The caseloads per officer
are now [approximately] 36. It has enhanced public safety by allowing more
offender contacts in the community and in the office. It has allowed more work
crew sanctions instead of jail sanctions (work crew also helps teach offenders
good work ethics). (Morrow county application).

Six counites planned to hire one or more part-time officers, half from rural
counties and half from urban counties. Urban counties also had the goal of hiring pretrial
officers, full time deputies, and part time deputies. Only one rural county, Clatsop county,
arranged to hire one pretrial officer for their only JRI program, which is a pretrial service
program. Officer training was intended in eight different counties, six of which are rural.
Three rural counties also hoped to get more equipment for their agencies. It is likely
urban counties already had the equipment necessary for their everyday workday. Even
though rural counties were not as likely to hire additional officers, they were more likely
to invest in officer training and equipment, which directly benefits the agency.
27

4) Invest in specialty courts
In the 1980s, specialty courts were developed to address the underlying issues that
impact criminal behavior. The objective of a specialty court is to divert an offender away
from prison or jail and provide rehabilitative services to reduce odds of recidivism (Wood
et al., 2018). These specialized courts focus on specific issues such as addiction, family,
veteran’s issues, among others. Since specialty courts were created with the purpose of
reducing recidivism, investing in them aligns with the Justice Reinvestments Act. The
two most mentioned courts in the 2017-2019 grant applications were drug courts and
mental health courts. Drug courts were formed as a response to the soaring number of
drug and alcohol related offenses. They provide effective treatment and appropriate
sanctions through a collaboration between the courts and the community (Morgan et al.,
2016). Mental health courts operate in the same manner with the focus being mental
health treatment rather than drug or alcohol addiction (Frailing, 2010).
While only five counites plotted to develop specific specialty court programs (see
Table 7), 19 of the 36 counties (53%) intended to invest in preexisting specialty courts.
Drug courts were set to receive funds from 14 counites, six counties wanted to help fund
mental health courts, three aimed to invest in veteran treatment courts, and two targeted
family courts. Multnomah county and Polk county vaguely stated their JRI funds were
helping fund specialty courts, but they did not specific the type of court. Eleven urban
counties stated they wanted to invest in specialty courts compared to eight rural counties.
Table 4 displays the frequency and the type of courts mentioned in the grant applications.
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Table 4
The type and frequency of specialty courts invested in across Oregon
Specialty Court

Frequency

Adult Drug Court

14

Mental Health Court

6

Veterans Treatment Court

3

Specialty Court: not specified

2

Family Court

2

Family Dependency Court

1

Reentry Court

1

Community Diversion Courts

1

Community Court

1

Hybrid Treatment Court

1

Fostering Attachment treatment Court

1

Behavioral Intervention Court

1

Counites not invested

17

The following courts were only referred to by one county: family dependency court,
reentry court, community diversion courts, community court, hybrid treatment court,
fostering attachment treatment court, and behavioral intervention court.
5) Invest in victim services
The JRI grant requires ten percent of the funds allocated to each county to go
towards victim services, consequently 100% of counites have enacted victim service
programs. Three categories were extracted from all victim services programs
implemented in Oregon: domestic violence and sexual assault, child abuse and neglect,
and general victim services. Multnomah county and Curry county were the only counites
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to allege the implementation of all three services. Sixteen counties focused on both
domestic violence and sexual assault and child abuse and neglect programs. The
remaining counties only aimed to develop one of the three services in their communities.
Table 5 displays the type of victim services hoped to be adopted by each county. Twelve
counties solely focused on domestic violence and sexual assault services, two counties
only wanted child abuse and neglect services, and four all rural counties aimed to fund
only general victim services. Overall, 30 counties (83%) wanted to fund programs
specifically tailored towards survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault, 20
counties (56%) wanted child abuse and neglect services, and six counties (17%) claimed
to invest in general victim services.
General victim services are services not focused on specific groups but are rather
focused on helping all victims through processing trauma including mental health
counseling and life enrichment workshops. Wheeler county was the only county to
allocate more than the required percentage towards victim services, with 20% of their JRI
funds going towards victim services.
6) Hold offenders accountable
The push towards less prison use may give the public the impression that
offenders are being let off for their crimes. The Justice Reinvestment Act makes it a point
that holding offenders accountable for their actions is required of every county. In the JRI
grant application, counties are asked how their programs are designed to hold offenders

30

Table 5
The type of victim service programs developed across the counties
Multnomah
Washington
Clackamas
Lane
Marion
Jackson
Deschutes
Linn
Douglas
Yamhill
Benton
Josephine
Polk
Umatilla
Klamath
Coos
Columbia
Lincoln
Clatsop
Malheur
Tillamook
Wasco
Union
Jefferson
Crook
Hood River
Curry
Baker
Morrow
Lake
Harney
Grant
Wallowa
Gilliam
Sherman
Wheeler

Domestic violence & sexual
assault
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

Child abuse and neglect
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

General victim
services
✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
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liable. This goal is less concrete, giving counties the ability to interpret this with more
liberty than the first five goals.
Every county, with the exception of Gilliam county, detailed how their JRI
programs promote offender accountability. The main methods of promoting
accountability were through increased supervision and finding alternative sanctions.
Supervision strategies varied between counties and between offenders. With the use of
the risk-needs assessment, programs were able to identify the most appropriate form for
community supervision for each offender. Generally, risk-needs assessments include
identifying the offender’s traits, past behavior, and criminogenic needs to categorize their
likelihood of recidivism. This information is used to provide the proper rehabilitative
intervention and the suitable level and form of supervision (Miller & Maloney, 2013).
Counties identified pretrial release supervision, electronic court date reminders, day
reporting centers, frequent contact with clients, ensuring restitution payments were being
made, electronic monitoring, alcohol monitoring, and random drug tests as forms of
supervision that hold offenders liable for their criminal behavior.
Collaborative tactics with treatment service providers and parole and probation
officers were also used to ensure accountability. Some counties invested in additional jail
beds in order to hold offenders accountable under jail supervision. Counties made the
distinction between long-term and short-term strategies in promoting accountability.
Short-term strategies included swift and certain punishment, while long-term strategies
included treatment services focused on behavior change. For example, Crook county
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stated their Batterer’s Intervention Program is a long-term strategy given the specific
behavior change they aimed to attain.
Some counties had unique approaches to offender accountability. Multnomah
county wanted to partner with the victims allowing them to report any concerns or issues.
Klamath county gave the following account,
KCCC has assigned an Accountability Team (A-Team) to increase accountability.
Each day a team of Parole and Probation Officers are assigned to fieldwork. The
team receives notice of offenders who do not attend treatment, community
service, or other services as directed. Once the notices are received, the A- Team
immediately responds by going into the field to locate the offender. The A-Team
can provide a ride to the service; impose an intervention or a sanction. (Klamath
county application).

Klamath county is an urban county with a detailed plan on how they plan to hold
offenders accountable. Wheeler county, with a population of less than 2,000 people,
believed social stigma through community service was enough for offenders to feel
accountable. They state,
Community Service as a form of sentencing allows for the public to observe the
end results of someone who is being held accountable for their transgressions
against the criminal justice system. This public awareness may act to discourage
others from offending…This has an overall deterrent effect on whether the
offender feels that they can commit new crimes. (Klamath county application).

This approach in holding offenders accountable is simple compared to the plan of
Klamath county. Gilliam county did not spell out any specific approach for offender
accountability. They mention having a goal of holding offenders liable, but they do not
mention any steps they have taken.
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7) Increase public safety
Much like the goal of offender accountability, increasing public safety is an
ambiguous goal which can be taken in many directions. All 36 counties offered an
account for how they considered public safety when developing their JRI programs. The
approaches for holding offenders accountable overlapped with the tactics of increase
public safety. Offenders placed under supervision or in rehabilitative programs inherently
makes the community a safer place.
Evidence-based community correction programs were developed in counties with
the idea of successfully reducing recidivism. Counties claimed their community
corrections programs did reduce recidivism as well as crime rates, which helped increase
public safety. Counties that included substance abuse treatment and mental health
counseling also claimed these services helped change offender behavior through
successful reintegration. Some counties, such as Polk county, used increased law
enforcement, while other counties found increased community supervision and
collaboration with different agencies to be essential in increasing public safety. Much like
the goal of offender accountability, counties resorted to both the listed long-term efforts
for public safety and the use swift and certain sanctions as short-term public safety
measures. Crook county provided two explanation about the efforts of increasing public
safety. One explanation is more established claiming its Batterer’s Intervention Program
holds offenders accountable and increases public safety,
…the more offenders are engaged in treatment, whether it is inpatient or a
structured outpatient program, or treatment in the jail facility, the less likely they
are to reoffend. The more we can help offenders build their self-esteem, self34

worth, change their life-style, stabilize them in housing and employment, the less
likely they are to reoffend or victimize citizens in our community…Starting up a
new Batterer's Intervention Program is a big step in public safety. If we can effect
change in assaultive type behavior, then we can reduce the chances of more
victims in our community. (Crook county application).

The other explanation relies on the size and involvement of the community,
Being in a small community, both our Department and the offenders are very much
in the eye of the public. The Crook County Sheriff's Office also holds a Citizen
Academy yearly and the public can be educated on what we do, what is expected of
our offender population, and also learn judicial limitations.
The public is aware when offenders are incarcerated; they notice when they are out
on the work crew, and they have a sense of security when there is visibility. (Crook
county application).

The Crook county approach to increasing public safety has two very different methods.
They recognize that their small community allows for more transparency, but they are
still developing additional programs to actively work on reducing victims of domestic
violence.
This section discussed how these counites have met the seven goals of the Justice
Reinvestment Act. Table 6 displays which counties have stated they are meeting the goals
of JRI. Table 6 also displays which goals are more commonly met in the state of Oregon.
Focusing prison resources on violent offenders, investing in evidence-based community
corrections, local law enforcement, specialty courts, and victim services were more
established goals. There was a pool of options counties could have chosen for these goals,
depending on their individual needs, whereas holding offenders accountable and
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Table 6
Seven goals of H. B. 3194 accounted for by each county
Violent
Offences
Multnomah
✔
Washington
Clackamas
Lane
✔
Marion
Jackson
✔
Deschutes
Linn
Douglas
Yamhill
✔
Benton
✔
Josephine
Polk
Umatilla
Klamath
Coos
Columbia
Lincoln
Clatsop
✔
Malheur
✔
Tillamook
Wasco
Union
Jefferson
Crook
Hood River
Curry
Baker
Morrow
Lake
Harney
Grant
Wallowa
Gilliam
Sherman
Wheeler
*Community Corrections

CC*
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

Local
Agencies

Specialty
Courts

Victim
Service

Accountability

Public
Safety

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔
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increasing public safety were ambiguous goals. Counties likely had a broad interpretation
on how to achieve these goals and responses likely required some creativity.
As stated above, every county was required to use ten percent of their funds
towards victim services, thus 100% of counties met this goal. All 36 counties also stated
their JRI programs increased public safety. Thirty-five of the 36 counties (97%) included
language to specify how they are holding offenders accountable for their actions while
still aiming to decrease prison use. Only seven of the 36 counties (19%) specified that
they reserved prison resources for violent offenders and placed non-violent offenders in
their community corrections programming. Evidence-based community correction
programs were said to be implemented in 26 counites (72%). Investing in local law
enforcement was also claimed by 72% of counties. Nineteen counties (53%) stated they
invested in at least one specialty court. The more populated counties reached more goals
than the less populated counties. Urban counties receiving more grant funds could
account for their ability to reach more goals than rural counties.
The second research question aimed to explore the differences in programs across
Oregon counties. The 2017-2019 grant applications revealed the intent to implement 95
JRI programs across Oregon. In addition, 56 victim service programs were proposed as
required by the Oregon JRI grant program. For the purpose of this paper, victim service
programs are discussed separately from the other JRI programs. The 95 JRI programs
were divided into seven categorize: specialty courts, pre-trial programs, in-jail treatment
services, community-based treatment centers, community corrections, additional staff and
resources, and evidence-based assessment programs. Table 7 portrays the type(s) of
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Table 7
JRI program categories by county
Specialty
Courts

Pretrial
Program

In-jail
Tx

Comm.
Tx

CC*

Multnomah
Washington
✔
✔
Clackamas
✔
✔
✔
Lane
✔
Marion
✔
✔
✔
Jackson
✔
✔
Deschutes
Linn
✔
✔
Douglas
✔
Yamhill
✔
Benton
✔
✔
Josephine
✔
✔
Polk
✔
✔
Umatilla
✔
✔
Klamath
Coos
✔
Columbia
Lincoln
✔
Clatsop
✔
Malheur
✔
Tillamook
✔
Wasco
✔
✔
Union
✔
Jefferson
✔
✔
Crook
✔
✔
Hood River
✔
Curry
✔
Baker
✔
✔
Morrow
Lake
✔
Harney
✔
Grant
✔
Wallowa
✔
✔
Gilliam
✔
Sherman
✔
Wheeler
Note: Comm.=community, Tx=treatment, Assess.=assessment, Add.=additional
*Community Corrections

Assess.
Centers

Add.
Resources

✔

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
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program(s) each county had the intent of developing. Multnomah county, Columbia
County, and Deschutes county all proposed one JRI program that consisted of different
elements. These three programs were excluded from Table 7, as these programs were
more encompassing and not dedicated to a single element of JRI. As well, Table 7 is not
reflective of the number of intended programs in each county as some counties listed
multiple programs under the same category.
Community corrections, additional staff and resources, and community-based
treatment services were the most common type of programs. Community corrections was
the most common with 24 counties aiming to implement specific programs tailored
towards community corrections. Sixteen counties proposed programs with the purpose of
hiring additional staff or resources, and seven counties wanted to create specific
community-based treatment services. Specialty courts, evidence-based assessment
centers, pretrial programs, and in-jail treatment services were the least common
categories. Of the six counties that planned to implement in-jail treatment services, five
were urban counties. Of the four counties that developed pretrial programs, only one was
a rural county. These were the only differences observed between urban and rural
counties. Most programs were dispersed evenly across Oregon.
Note that many counties already planned to incorporate treatment services in their
community correction programs, thus not requiring the need to develop a specific
program solely devoted to treatment. For example, Lincoln county planned to implement
a community corrections program that also included community treatment services. Since
the main program was community corrections, it was only recorded as such and not both
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community corrections and community treatment. Some counties planned to invest in
existing programs like specialty courts, but they did not develop a specific program
dedicated to specialty courts. These investment types were also excluded from Table 7.
So far, the discussion has focused on whether each county has implemented
programs that fall in line with the Justice Reinvestment Act in Oregon. The third question
remains whether the Justice Reinvestment Act is adhering to the spirit of the JRI
literature. Whether or not Oregon has accomplished the goals of JRI is beyond the scope
of this study. What is within the abilities of this research is whether Oregon has
approached JRI in a manner that is in line with the literature. The Justice Reinvestment
Act aims to invest in services known to reduce recidivism, reduce prison use for nonviolent offenders, increase public safety, and reinvest averted prison costs into local
public safety infrastructure. While these goals fall in line with some of the literature
surrounding JRI, there is missing language specifically related to proactive measures of
ensuring successful reentry. Tucker and Cadora (2003) stress the need for JRI to invest in
local programs that will create an environment suitable for successful reintegration such
as healthcare, job availability, and educational opportunities. In other words, these
programs should invest in the environment of offenders just as much as offenders
themselves. Oregon’s JRI bill does not address how to strengthen individual
neighborhoods to keep residents out of prison.
According to Rivers (2011), JRI implementation requires four steps: 1) identify
the causes of jails and prison population growth; 2) creating policies which generate
savings and increase public safety; 3) quantify said savings and reinvesting in high-risk
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communities; and 4) measure the impact of these initiatives. Oregon has identified the
drivers of prison and jail and developed several policies including removing mandatory
minimums for repeat drug offenders and reducing sentences for marijuana offenses,
driving while suspended, and other offences; and strengthening reentry programming by
expanding transitional leave, implementing earned discharge, and requiring the use of
risk-needs evaluations (LaVigne et al., 2014). Oregon is measuring the impact of these
initiatives by requiring reporting progress and financial spending for community
supervision, rehabilitation research, and evidence-based programing to the Oregon
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC, 2018). According to the Urban Institute (2017)
Oregon has reinvested $98 million from upfront investment and subsequent reinvestment
from savings and averted costs from 2013 to 2016.
Table 8 provides an overview of the goals of the justice reinvestment literature
and whether these goals are stated in the Justice Reinvestment Act in Oregon. Oregon
did include language in House Bill 3194 which states its aim to reduce prison use, reduce
recidivism, reduce prison costs, and maintain public safety. LaVigne et al. (2014) and
House Bill 3194 show Oregon worked to identify the drivers of mass incarceration and
create policy which targeted certain offenses. It also emphasizes the goal of reinvesting
actual savings after they are realized. The two goals that Oregon does not mention are the
need to invest proactive measures which will keep people out of prison and the need to
focus reinvestment on high risk communities.
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Table 8
Justice reinvestment goals included in Oregon’s Justice Reinvestment Act
Goals of General JRI

Justice Reinvestment Act

Identify driver of incarceration

Included

Create policy to address drivers

Included

Decrease prison use

Included

Reduce recidivism

Included

Reduce prison costs

Included

Maintain public safety

Included

Reinvest actual savings

Included

Assess measures

Included

Invest in proactive measures

Not included

Reinvest in the physical infrastructure
of high-risk communities

Not included
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Discussion
The language in the 2017-2019 JRI grant applications was tailored towards
reducing recidivism through the use of community corrections and treatment services.
The application itself was focused on questioning how counties planned to reduce
recidivism and consequently, counties focused on explaining their plans on recidivism.
The claims associated with public safety and offender accountability were strongly
associated with community correction services and the reduction of recidivism. Counties
were certain their community correction programs were successfully reducing recidivism
and crime. They believed these achievements would effectively increase public safety.
Their justification for holding offenders accountable was by placing them into alternative
sanctions for their actions.
While specialty courts are also an evidence-based practice used to reduce
recidivism, only 19 counties alleged to invest in these types of courts. Specialty courts
work to address the underlying issues that impact criminal behavior with the goal of
diverting offenders away from prison or jail and provide rehabilitative services to reduce
recidivism (Wood et al., 2018). Drug courts were the most common type of courts across
the grant application. This is not surprising given it is the most well-known specialty
court in the nations (Morgan et al., 2016). This analysis cannot conclude whether
counties that have not invested in specialty courts do not have access to these services. It
could be that the county is already funding these courts and there is no need for additional
funds. They could be putting their JRI funds towards more eminent matters. Counties that
do not have access to specialty courts should consider partnering with neighboring
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counties with these services. They could work together by sharing judges and information
to provide defendants with appropriate services, including treatment and sanctions. This
collaboration would benefit the individual, the public, and the state by steering them
away from incarceration and providing rehabilitative services. This collaboration would
fall in line with the JRI notion of centering the responsibility on the government,
community, and the individual.
Oregon is one of only eight JRI states to invest in victim services and the only
state that requires a specified percentage of their JRI funds to go towards victim services
(Welsh-Loveman & Harvell, 2018). Victim services are generally not discussed within
the broader JRI literature, setting Oregon apart. There were three overarching categories
for victim services in Oregon: domestic violence and sexual assault, child abuse and
neglect, and general victim services. Domestic violence and sexual assault services were
the most common, with 30 counties (83%) aiming to fund these programs. The high
number of investments in these programs could mean there is high demand for victim
services related to domestic violence and sexual assault. The specific content of each
program seemed to be focused on women, utilizing women’s shelters and like services.
One in seven men are victims of domestic violence (Niolon et al., 2017), but there was no
language in the 2017-2019 applications to suggest programs are being developed to assist
male victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. Again, the grant application
coordinators should take note of this lack of service.
Oregon is only one of three JRI states to invest in local law enforcement (WelshLoveman & Harvell, 2018). In Oregon, urban counites were found more likely to invest
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in additional officers, while rural counites were more likely to invest in officer training
and equipment. In general, urban counties received more funds than rural counties given
they have more residents to service. More populated counties likely had the funds and the
justifications to hire more personnel, whereas rural counties might benefit more from
training the officers they already have and investing in company equipment.
It is not clear whether rural counties received less funds because they need less or
because the state cannot justify giving these counties more money. The Justice
Reinvestment Act gives counties the flexibility to implement programs that best fit their
needs, however, if smaller counties are not being given the necessary resources then they
will be limited on the type of programs they can develop. The current analysis does not
provide proof for these claims, but nonetheless, the CJC should take these thoughts into
consideration when distributing the grant funds.
Table 9 provides an overview of how Oregon counties are doing in regards to the
goals of the Justice Reinvestment Act. Most counites are wanting to invest in community
corrections, law enforcement, specialty courts, and victim services. Only a little over half
the counties plan to invest in specialty courts, which means there needs to be a bigger
effort on behalf of the other counties. Almost every county gave an account as to how
they are promoting offender accountability and public safety. Focusing prison resources
on violent offenders is the only goals where counites are lacking language. Only 19% of
county applications specifically describe how they are meeting this goal. However,
Oregon did amend its laws to reduce sentences for some non-violent offenses. The CJC
should ensure counties are using their JRI for non-violent offenders.
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Table 9
Seven goals of H. B. 3194 summary
House Bill 3194 Goals

Met/partially met

1) Focus prison resources on violent offenders

Partially met

2) Invest in evidence-based community corrections

Met

3) Invest in local law enforcement

Met

4) Invest in specialty courts

Partially met

5) Invest in victim services

Met

6) Hold offenders accountable

Met

7) Increase public safety

Met

The grant application for JRI funds in Oregon lacks specific language related to
the goals of House Bill 3194. The application describes the bill as having four goals: 1)
reduce recidivism through evidence-based practices, 2) reduce prison populations for
property, drug, and driving offenses, 3) increase public safety, and 4) hold offenders
accountable. They also include investing in victim services as another goal in a different
section of the application. House Bill 3194 clearly states the need to focus prison
resources on violent offenders, invest in community corrections, specialty courts, and law
enforcement, and it requires reinvesting in local public safety infrastructure and yet this
text is not included in the grant application.
The first goal listed in the application seems to be an overarching goal for
investing in community corrections, specialty courts, and law enforcement as these are all
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vital in reducing recidivism. Since the goal of the Justice Reinvestment Act is to give
counties the liberty to implement the programs that best fit their local needs, this general
language may give counties that flexibility. It seems unrealistic for counites, especially
smaller counties, to invest in all the listed programs. This does not change the fact that
the goals of the Justice Reinvestment Act are to invest in all these services. The findings
suggest counties are not given enough guidelines for where they need to be investing.
The application needs to include a list of these programs and require counties to invest in
at least one type of service in an effort to increase the success of JRI in Oregon.
The second goal in the application hints at the need to focus prison resources on
violent offenders and reduce prison use for non-violent offenders. This language in this
section needs to be tightened so counties are clear about excluding violent offenders from
their community based JRI programs. The target population is required for every program
listed in the application. This section of the application needs to ask if violent offenders
will be eligible for the program. This tighter language will hold more counties
accountable on meeting the first goal of the Justice Reinvestment Act.
Developing an application with specific language on the goals of the Justice
Reinvestment Act will give counties a better understanding of the bill. If counties do not
have a clear understanding of the JRI literature or even the Oregon bill itself, then trying
to create programs that fall in line with the goals will be a difficult task. Having an
application with specific language about the requirements of the bill could provide
counties with more resources to understand the point of JRI and subsequently lead to
better program development.
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States with JRI have invested almost three dollars out of every five dollars into
community supervision and community-based treatment and services, which is roughly
57% of total JRI reinvestment (Welsh-Loveman & Harvell, 2018). Community
corrections was the most common type of program implemented across Oregon as seen in
Table 7. These programs ranged from reentry, transitional housing, diversion, day
reporting, work crew, and general services. Reentry and transitional housing were the
most common forms of community corrections. The majority of community correction
programs included a treatment aspect. Taxman et al. (2014) stress the importance of
including and increasing the number of accessible intervention and treatment programs in
JRI efforts. They call for effective programing both within correctional and community
settings. They argue that increased access to these programs can reduce recidivism rates
as well as reincarceration rates. The 2017-2019 grant applications demonstrate Oregon’s
commitment to these programs. There is a clear need for more treatment services within
correctional facilities as only two counties planned to develop specific programs for these
services. The grant program coordinators should take note of this lack of service. They
could either work with counties to implement more services or they could directly invest
in them at the state level.
The Justice Reinvestment Act does follow the justice reinvestment literature for
the most part. Table 1 and Table 8 demonstrate the goals of JRI in Oregon are very
similar to those of the general JRI literature. There are two goals not being planned by
Oregon, which include taking proactive measures to create a better environment upon
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offender release and focus reinvestment in communities most impacted by mass
incarceration.
Policy Recommendations
The Justice Reinvestment Act should be amended to include the full extent of the
JRI literature. The amendment should include a plan or goal of reinvesting in the
environment of communities with high imprisonment rates. It should include a plan for
strengthening neighborhoods to keep residents away from prison. More targeted
community-specific investments, as opposed to system-wide investments, is the
component of Oregon’s JRI goals and initiatives that is most lacking when contrasted
with earlier visions of JRI described by Tucker and Cadora (2003) and Clear (2011). The
amendment should include a separate fund solely focused on creating proactive measures
in high risk communities. This fund should not follow the same structure as the grant
application. Rather, the state of Oregon needs to identify the neighborhoods with the
highest rates of imprisonment and directly work with the county in developing the best
programs for that neighborhood. Depending on the needs of the neighborhood a number
of programs can be created such as investing in public schools and structured activity for
youth to deter delinquency. A scholarship fund could be started in low-income
neighborhoods with underprivileged schools. If the issue of high imprisonment in a
neighborhood stems from high single-parent households, then vocational training and
affordable childcare centers can be developed. If unemployment is a major concern, then
the county could form partnerships with local communities to create jobs. They could
even hire those returning to the community to rebuild the physical infrastructure of the
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neighborhood. This would benefit the community and teach the offender vocational
skills. These should not be confused with work crew programs or restitution jobs. Rather
these should be formal jobs where the offender can also give back to the community by
building aspects of the community. The number of possible programs is extensive, but
the county and state should clearly identity the underlying issue leading to high rates of
imprisonment and develop programs accordingly.
An agency level policy can also be provided given the literature. Agencies should
adapt a geographic approach for assigning cases to parole and probation officers. Parole
and probations officers should be assigned cases based on the neighborhood of the
offenders rather than being dispersed through the city or county. Focusing on a single
neighborhood allows officers to better understand the needs of that community which
would improve the productivity of the officer and improve the level of support they
provide their clients.
Limitations
The data for this research is from the 2017-2019 biennial grant cycle. There have
been two rounds of grant applications before this cycle and one currently underway. Only
studying one round of grant distributions narrows the scope of the type and quantity of
programs developed across Oregon. The narrow scope has the potential to distort the
perception of what is being implemented across Oregon. For example, additional
equipment for all counties could have been bought with the 2013-2015 grant awards and
thus not present in the 2017-2019 applications. Future research needs to examine the
application since the 2013-2015 biennial until the most current application cycle to get a
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broader picture of JRI programs in Oregon. This study should be replicated after 2023,
when the CJC estimates the effects of JRI will be more evident (LaVigne et al., 2014).
Another limitation of this study is the uncertainty of the applications. This data
cannot determine if these programs were actually developed in each county. The data can
only display the intention and the area of focus for each county. This analysis found most
counties did account for how they are holding offenders accountable and increasing
public safety. This does not mean they are actually following through with their claims.
On the other hand, just because counties did not explicitly state they are focusing prison
resources on violent offenders does not mean are not meeting this goal. Verifying
whether these goals were being met was out of the scope of this research.
The vagueness of certain goals allowed for a broad interpretation on behalf of the
counties. This hinders the reliability of the findings because the interpretation is too broad
for a comparison across counties.
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Conclusion
The stated goals of the 36 counties in Oregon fall in line with the majority of
goals in the Justice Reinvestment Act. The structure of the grant application plays a role
in only 19% of counties stating they plan to exclude violent offenders from their JRI
programs. If the question were explicitly stated in the application as to their inclusion or
exclusion of violent offenders, counties could better express their methods for reaching
these objectives. The grant program needs to edit the application to include sharper
language related to violent offenders.
After reviewing the literature on JRI and House Bill 3194 it became evident that
the Justice Reinvestment Act is falling a bit short on the intended purpose of JRI as
described by some of its founding proponents. It is recommended that House Bill 3194 is
amended to reflect the full literature of JRI. As it stands, the act is more reflective of a
bill designed to reduce recidivism by focusing exclusively on criminal justice system
investments. The amendment should include an additional grant to invest in
neighborhoods with high imprisonments rates. The state needs to identify these
neighborhoods and work directly with the county to identify proactive measures. These
measures should strengthen the neighborhood resources, infrastructure, and networks to
prevent prison admissions and successfully reintegrate returning inmates. Investing in the
environment of these communities is a vital step in the JRI literature.
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